Attacks on shipping in the strategic Straits of Hormuz in the event of greatly increased tensions with Iran is one of the future worst-case scenarios that military (and economic) planners grapple with. And for a period this week it appeared that a Japanese oil tanker en route from the UAE to Japan may have been the first victim of an attack in the region since the tanker wars.

Accusations have ranged from an AQ-inspired or rogue Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Navy attack to a freak wave caused by an underwater tremor. But as the first photos emerged of a dented but not penetrated hull the mystery only deepened and an attack (particularly with no follow-up) appears to have become less likely.

The days and weeks ahead will tell us more about exactly what happened, but it once again highlights the sensitivity of the Straits of Hormuz, through which 20% of global oil production passes.

As an aside, there are a number of think tanks looking at the implications to world economies of conflict in the Straits, and while most agree that Iran's ability to close the Straits is limited to a few days, if at all, there has been some interesting work done on the increased insurance premiums (which would be passed on to the consumer) in the event of conflict in the Gulf (based largely on the medium intensity tanker wars mentioned previously). It makes the likely petrol price hike appear very manageable.

Photo by Flickr user franscaspers, used under a Creative Commons license.

Hizbullah, always keen to maintain its reputation as first and foremost a Lebanese nationalist resistance movement, is facing increasing difficulty in maintaining this fig leaf of respectability in the complex sectarian political terrain of Lebanon.

The latest, and most serious challenge to this claim is the prospect of having some of its members indicted by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) for involvement in the 2005 assassination of five time prime minister Rafiq Hariri.

Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah gave a pre-emptive press conference on the issue on Thursday at which he advised the audience that Prime Minister Sa’ad Hariri had told him of the likelihood of the STL charging Hizbullah members, but that the prime minister would acknowledge that the members were ‘rogue’ elements.

Hizbullah has been quick to deny involvement in the assassination, for it well knows the implications were such a claim to be alleged, let alone proven and Nasrallah has been busy using the media to press his case that it is all a conspiracy. In particular Hizbullah has sought to discredit the basis on which the investigation claims they were involved; cell phone records implicating Hizbullah members in the assassination.

The recent arrest of three members of the Alfa mobile phone company on suspicion of spying for Israel provides the perfect excuse — data manipulation by Israel designed to deliberately implicate Hizbullah members.

While no indictments have been issued, there is good reason for Hizbullah’s leadership to be nervous. Having crossed a long-term self-imposed ‘red line’ in May 2008 by taking up arms against fellow Lebanese with its takeover of West Beirut, any credible accusation that they were involved in the assassination of the Sunni prime minister will have long-term national and regional political and sectarian consequences.

Yes, it's now official. Afghan security primacy in four years' time and the west can turn off the lights (or at least dim them) and leave. For all the talk of 'conditions-based' withdrawal, a timeline had to be set at some stage for everybody's sake. And it's not as if the West hadn't been signaling its intent for some time.  The Dutch are to withdraw this year, the Canadians next, while the newly-elected UK prime minister said that he wanted all British troops out by 2015. Even Australia tentatively outlined a timetable of between two and four years by which time it would be able to leave Oruzgun in Afghan hands.  So 2014 certainly ticks the UK and Australian boxes.

But realistically we are all but support players to the US, the main act in the Afghan security play.  And here the Obama Administration has been doing some shaping operations of its own. Having publicly stated that the US will begin its withdrawal of its forces in a year's time, President Obama was always going to lay himself open to accusations of a precipitous withdrawal timetable, leaving before the job was done.

So the Administration has cleverly been defining what its definition of 'getting the job done' means. If the measure of success was that defined by President Bush as recently as four years ago,  with Afghanistan following Iraq as the beacons of West Asian democratic flowering, then forces would still be there for decades with no guarantee of success. 

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The death of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah last week brought out tens of thousands of people to his funeral in Beirut, giving an indication of his following in the country. Those who have since spoken well of him, such as the British ambassador to Lebanon and the CNN editor Octavia Nasr, have respectively had their knuckles rapped or been sacked. I will just say that the man did definitely exude a sense of gravitas (and was extremely well protected) when I interviewed him as part of my academic research in 2008.

More importantly, his death opens a window into the complex world of Shi'a Islamic jurisprudence, particularly what occurs on the death of such a highly regarded marja', or source of emulation. We can roughly equate the relationship between the Pope and observant Catholics to that which a grand marja' has with his followers — both are regarded as infallible in their interpretations of God's will and there is thus a binding unwritten agreement between followers and the guide to trust in his wisdom.

There the similarities end, however. While there is only one Pope, there are several marja', and observant Shi'a are free to switch between marja' as they see fit or even to follow different marja', depending on the subject matter. This marja' for political issues and that one for social policy matters, for example.

One's choice of marja' depends on a number of things; your view of his level of learning, the topics he discusses, his political leanings, his ethnicity. Fadlallah, as the only Lebanese marja', naturally attracted support from Lebanese Shi'a both at home and among the diasporic community (including in Australia). But he was also popular with youth and women because of his willingness to address practical contemporary topics and issue fatawa (religious opinions) about women's rights, smoking and medical research, topics that more conservative clerics steered away from.

Little noticed in Australia was the inaugural Arab League Pacific Islands summit held in Abu Dhabi in late June.

This earlier post highlighted the UAE's interest in the South Pacific in trying to secure votes for its candidacy to house the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi – a bid that was ultimately successful.

The UAE has followed up on its initial engagement with the region by convening the forum in Abu Dhabi. Such follow-up accords with the Emiratis' desire to raise its international diplomatic profile, albeit in a more measured and less aggressive manner than its Gulf neighbour Qatar.

The benefits of engaging with the island states was apparent from the joint communiqué issued at the end of the summit. For its part, the UAE gained Pacific islands endorsement for its call to Iran to undertake negotiations to resolve the 'three islands dispute', and support for the creation of a nuclear free zone within the Middle East (aimed at both Iran and Israel).

For their part, the Pacific Islands were able to stake their claims for Pacific Partnership funding from the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, as the prime minister of the Solomons noted. Fiji's prime minister called for a permanent Gulf presence in the region and even managed to get in a not so subtle dig at Australia when he asked those assembled to 'recognise the point of differential between the small Pacific island developing states and the metropolitan powers in the Pacific region'.

Australia already has a robust relationship with the UAE, given the number of Australian companies operating and expats living there, the fact that it is one of our top 20 international trading partners, and because it plays host to our regional military headquarters. The UAE's increasing interest in the Pacific Island states now gives us a common interest in our, as opposed to their, backyard.

Photo by Flickr user Daniel Y. Go, used under a Creative Commons license.

One doesn't normally associate resource wars with the Levant (apart from concerns about water supplies). But tensions are emerging over something normally associated with the Persian Gulf: several large offshore gas fields have been discovered that promise significant economic advantage for Israel. Naturally, the gas fields' proximity to Lebanon has meant that Beirut has expressed concerns over exploitation of what it claims could be a shared resource.

Part of Lebanon's problem is that it has yet to pass its own oil and gas exploration bill, so sits in learned helplessness as its southern neighbor seeks to exploit its economic resources. Non-specific claims from some Lebanese politicians that these fields encroach onto Lebanese territory have been met with statements from Israeli Infrastructure minister Uzi Landau that Israel would use force to protect those fields if necessary.

The best outcome would be for Israel's apparent success to galvanise Lebanon's own politicians to open the way for exploratory drilling that, according to Norwegian-conducted seismic surveys, may yield practical results.

Who knows? A Lebanese government that used its resource income to pay down national debt and improve infrastructure and services may even blunt the electoral appeal of Hizbullah's social services. And an economically booming Lebanon may also enhance Israel's security by massively raising the domestic political cost to Hizbullah of any military misadventure on its part that brought Israeli retribution.

But even if the Lebanese political system is incapable of equitably distributing any economic bonus, at least it will be a pleasant change for eastern Mediterranean countries to negotiate boundaries to share economic largesse rather than as a means of fulfilling UN Security Council resolutions.

Photo by Flickr user sidewalk flying, used under a Creative Commons license.

I'm always a bit suspicious when big public policy projects have round numbers attached. While ministerial and political statements love round numbers, nature and real project management normally don't.

Which brings me to the number 100. When I was in Army HQ in the late 1990s, the new ministerial team swept in, bringing with it the Defence Efficiency Review and the Defence Reform Program. In an effort to 'speed up decision-making' and get uniformed personnel into combat formations, all Service HQs were told to pare themselves down to 100 people. I have been suspicious of round numbers applied to defence decision-making ever since.

This arbitrary number was obviously arrived at in some policy wonk's office with no idea of the  second- and third-order effects of such a poorly thought-through decision. But at least in these staffing cases, the organisation just waits out the inevitable turnover/departure of the minister and his staff, and then repairs the damage over time.

But very expensive equipment decisions can't be turned around so readily, as contracts are signed with long delivery lead times. So when I look at the savings pressures on Defence and I see that we need 100 Joint Strike Fighters at US$112 million (and counting) each, I wonder who came up with this awfully neat number.

The army bought 59 refurbished Abrams tanks from the US. Now, 59 is an strange sort of number and not one likely to make for a hard-hitting policy announcement, so I can only assume that someone did their sums and determined that 59 is the required basis of provisioning for operational and training purposes. Similarly, 22 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters for the army and 46 multi-role helicopters for the army and navy both indicate that some degree of detailed research has gone into arriving at these figures.

So when the Strategic Reform Program is looking for $20 billion in savings, I think it's fair to ask why the Air Force needs exactly 100 JSFs? And how was this very neat total arrived at?

Photo by Flickr user brianjmatis, used under a Creative Commons license.

I always like reading Graeme Dobell's posts and I would like to add some comments to his latest on regional footballing diplomacy. But before I do, I must admit my sporting bias — I am an unabashed Rugby Union tragic.

While there is no doubt that there are large numbers of players of Pacific heritage playing Rugby League in Australia, the same is true of Rugby Union. Watching the Rugby Union test against England on Saturday night, anyone would have noticed that the front row (which was admittedly turned into pretzels by their English opponents) contained Saia Faingaa and Salesi Maafu. 

Next week it's likely that Faingaa will be replaced by Tatafu Polota-Nau, when the latter returns from injury. The man of the match was the Maori-heritage Quade Cooper. Digby Ioane (New Zealand-born and of Samoan heritage) had a strong game while a likely future Wallabies captain and current Queensland captain, the PNG-born Will Genia, sat on the bench. Going back further, I remember the Tongan-born Viliami Ofahengaue (Willie O) scoring Australia's only try of the 1991 Rugby World Cup final.*

With this in mind, I think Graeme's view that 'League has given Australia a living window into its Island neighbours' is giving Rugby League a lot more credit than it deserves. While lots of players of Polynesian descent may play Rugby League in Australia, the game doesn't generate much interest in the Pacific, with the exception of League-mad PNG.

I have written elsewhere that Israel's inability to see challenges to its authority in anything but purely existential terms has led to a rigidity of thinking that erodes its ability to deter opponents.

The latest incident on the high seas involving the Israeli military again highlights some increasingly worrying professional shortfalls. Whereas Israeli military and security forces used to be synonymous with tight planning, elan, skill and audacity, there is growing evidence that this is no longer the case.

As the capabilities of its opponents has improved, the traditional strengths of Israeli planning seem to have deteriorated. During the 1980s and '90s, the IDF became largely an occupation force in the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon. And as the Russians, Americans, British, French and many others have found out over the years, no military does occupation of hostile territories well.

Years of being occupied with occupation appears to have degraded Israel's ability to plan and execute offensive operations. What else to make of the following comparisons:

I've gritted my teeth for long enough as people who should know better mount an outrageous scare campaign on an issue they patently know little about and care even less to find out about, and which has virtually no relevance in this country because of the miniscule number of people it affects.

This populist and factually incorrect article by Fred Nile is a good example.

For starters, can we actually decide what it is we are talking about? Here's a good 'veiling for dummies' guide, just to institute some consistency and accuracy into the 'debate'. And yes, I know 'burqa ban' is much more catchy for the media than 'nix the niqab', or 'check the chador at the door', but if you get the little facts wrong, then I have grave doubts about how much of the rest of the argument stacks up.

The first case in point is the reference in the artice to a number of women entering a crowded Russian theatre carrying weapons and explosives concealed under their burqas. I assume Nile is referring to the 2002 Nord-Ost siege in Moscow, where over 40 Chechen men and women stormed the theatre.

Sure, the women's faces were partially covered, but their weaponry certainly wasn't. When storming a fixed installation with weapons, after all, burqas are not the best ensemble. And as the above photo shows, some of the men also thought covering their faces was a good look. 

While the post-election world of Iraqi politics is still mired in confusion, as the prime minister Maliki’s State of Law coalition and former prime minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiyya coalition seek coalition partners, one thing is for certain: Iran seeks to be the winner in the long run. 

Iran faces challenges on several fronts; the internal security crackdown by an unpopular regime in the face of continued public opposition to its 2009 electoral manipulation, an economy that struggles to grow anywhere near sufficiently to accommodate the demands of a youthful population of 70 million people, a nuclear program that is causing nervousness in the region and has drawn the ire of the UN and the west, all buttressed by a revolutionary Islamic ideology that struggles for relevance and unity 30 years after its implementation. 

But in its dealings with Iraq it has shown a clear understanding of its own national interest. Iraq is a complex and immature political landscape. It thus represents an opportunity for Iran to achieve what it has sought since pre-revolutionary days — regional influence befitting its view of itself and ultimately, the role of regional security guarantor in place of the US. 

The first step in achieving this aim is to establish an Iraq devoid of US troop presence, where pro-Iranian Shi’a dominate politically but where the Shi’a nationalists and Sunnis are sufficiently empowered to ensure their quiescence but not powerful enough to stymie Iranian interests. And this influence is best entrenched while the institutions of state are still relatively weak.

It is something of an understatement to say that Arab voting patterns have tended to favour the incumbent in recent years.

Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak gained 94% of the vote in 1999 (as the only candidate) but a constitutional amendment allowing for multi-candidate presidential elections saw this reduced to a mere 88% in a ten-candidate contest in 2005. In Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh has seen his popularity slump from the 96% of the vote he secured in a two-horse race in 1999 to a precarious 77% in a five-horse race some seven years later.

The Ba'thists, though, really did understand the distraction of political campaigning when there was serious governing to be done, and hence preferred the certainty of single-candidate presidential ballots.

Greg Sheridan's article on the weekend argued that a decision to adopt a policy of containment of a nuclear-capable Iran was the only 'semi-intelligible explanation for Obama's bizarre overreaction against the Israelis', manifest in the reports of President Obama's less than warm reception of Prime Minister Netanyahu during a visit to Washington in late March.

I am more of the view that the treatment meted out during the visit had little to do with Administration views of Iran and everything to do with the Obama Administration running out of patience with the Netanyahu Government over the peace process. 

Consider the recent Israeli actions the White House has had to endure as it seeks to advance the Middle East peace process. On 11 January the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister deliberately and publicly humiliated the ambassador from Israel's closest non-Arab Middle Eastern ally and key peace process intermediary, Turkey. 

On 19 January the amateurish assassination of a senior Hamas official exposed Israel's alleged forging of friendly nations' passports in one of the few Arab countries that has adopted a pragmatic attitude to relations with Israel. And to top it off, on 19 March during a visit by the vice-president of the sole global superpower and Israel's closest ally, a government department announces the construction of 1600 new apartments in Jerusalem. 

This report regarding a skirmish between Saudi and Emirati naval (or more likely coast guard) forces is interesting not just because of its rarity but because it sheds light on the potential flashpoints that the ill-defined maritime borders within the Persian Gulf present.

The two countries have a long-running border dispute that as recently as August last year came to the surface. It is an annoyance rather than an impediment to close bilateral relations but the potential oil and gas reserves involved in the border region are significant enough that neither side is willing to cede ground ('scuse the pun) on the issue.

The clash, if it occurred, would likely have been in the ill-defined maritime corridor that juts out from the Saudi territory separating Qatar from the UAE, an area that was ceded by the UAE to Saudi Arabia in 1974 via an agreement that was never ratified by the UAE. The gas pipelines for the multi-billion dollar Dolphin Energy project between Qatar and the UAE pass through this area and Saudi Arabia has shown a willingness in the past to remind the project stakeholders of this fact.

Saudi Arabia last clashed with a GCC neighbour in 1992 when an incident at a Qatari border post left two Qataris dead. The border dispute was resolved some 16 years later.

Saudi Arabia's smaller neighbours jealously guard their independence. But they are also pragmatic enough to realise that antagonising Saudi Arabia is not good for business. This, and regional concerns over Iran's nuclear ambitions, means that none of the local press has reported on the issue — a clear indication that neither country wants this incident to publicly sour relations at a time when Gulf Arab solidarity is seen as paramount.

Photo by Flickr user abcdz2000, used under a Creative Commons license.

If it's not the Iranians seeking friends in the Pacific then it's the Israelis, and if it's not the Israelis it's the...Emiratis. The UAE's recently announced 'Partnership in the Pacific' is a US$50 million aid program administered by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, for use solely in the region.

In common with the motives of its regional neighbours, this Emirati largesse is in pursuit of the UAE's own foreign policy goals. But at least it's about something other than UN votes. In the UAE's case, the Partnership in the Pacific program was all about getting the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency to be housed in Abu Dhabi. Indeed, the Pacific states formed a critical element of the lobbying, as this breathless account from Dubai's own Khaleej Times shows. 

At the current rate of outside interest in the region, the University of the South Pacific may be well advised to add Arabic, Farsi and Hebrew classes to its Linguistics and Language Division. 

Jim Molan's post raises some excellent questions about the nexus between military commitment and political influence in the broader Australian-US relationship.

I agree with Jim's view that the national caveats that we have placed on our commitment in Afghanistan and that were in place for our battle group in Iraq have and will continue to irritate our allies, and that it makes the claim we are counterinsurgency experts ring a bit hollow. But I don't believe that in the long run such caveats have harmed our strategic interests.

Australia has limited military resources to expend so our contribution to coalitions is never going to be about quantity, rather it will more often be about the high quality niche capabilities we can provide, our ability to largely self-deploy and sustain ourselves and our ability to work effectively in US and British military staff systems.

Our presence I would argue is often of more importance than our contribution, particularly when the employment of military force is unpopular. Hence, while the US military likely saw our Vietnam contribution as making a qualitative difference due to the size and ability of our deployed forces, the broader (and much more long-term) political kudos we earned from our participation came from the fact that we were there when so many others weren't.

As a UN observer working in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon in the mid 1990s I was often told by Israelis that their sometimes abrupt attitude towards people working for the UN was because they were similar to spiky fruit — rough on the outside but sweet on the inside.

At the time I thought many of the people I dealt with would have been well served by perusing a copy of Emily Post's book on etiquette, or perhaps given their British mandatory heritage Debrett's Etiquette and Modern Manners may have been more appropriate.

I recount this because I thought that the treatment accorded me was a result of the fact that local Israelis felt the UN wasn't effectively contributing to security in South Lebanon. But recent events at a much higher political level would appear to reinforce the need for some etiquette teachers in Israel ASAP.

First there was the treatment of the Turkish ambassador by the Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon who seated him at a lower chair than him, dispensed with the Turkish flag at the meeting and told the accompanying cameraman in Hebrew that this treatment was a deliberate snub.

Not to be outdone, the Interior Minister Eli Yishai has had to apologise to the visiting American vice-president read more

I'm sorry to be so critical lately of others' posts, but if I disagree with a post on the blog about which I think I know something, I feel the need to speak out (hence my silence on economics, climate change, Asia etc). And so it is with Nick Floyd's post about the motivations driving your average Afghan to join the security forces.

For all the sadness of any soldier's death, the truth is that soldiers join armies for a range of reasons: the pay, a sense of adventure, hopes of learning transferable skills, as well as notions of patriotism. But to say that Afghans joining the security forces and government are doing so in order to revolutionise their society is to ascribe a motivation that does not necessarily exist.

The military desertion rate (9% by some accounts) and high turnover as a consequence of volunteers failing to re-enlist indicate that many are not such committed 'freedom fighters' as the author of the letter featured in Nick's post would have us believe. The endemic corruption in the police force is a further blow to the supposed selflessness of all Afghans in government service.

Far from 'dancing around' Chris Kenny's point that the surge set the military conditions for the orderly withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, I agree with him. My post had nothing to do with the merits of the surge, the success of which (along with other tactical and strategic levers that were employed) is self-evident.

Rather, my argument was that Chris' piece spoke in absolutes such as '(US) victory and a functioning (Iraqi) democracy', or in uncontrasted relativities such as 'relatively peaceful'. It spoke of the Iraq war in terms of its impact on the US, and equated victory with an orderly departure of its troops. 

In the same vein, Jim Molan says the counterinsurgency is finally, as wars go, a success. But when hundreds of Iraqis are routinely being killed (and more injured) every month by insurgents, I would argue that the counterinsurgency has been successful in relative but not absolute terms. And the latter is what we should be looking at more closely, because only Iraqi security forces will be able to achieve absolute success. 

My point is that the political measure of success appears to be the ability to withdraw US troops, not the security of the Iraqi population. By adopting this measure, Western commentators tend to conflate withdrawal with success, with little regard for the circumstances for the Iraqis left behind.

I don't think I have seen the words 'victory' and 'Iraq' used in the same sentence since President Bush declared in 2003 that the 'Battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror...' But having read Sam's link yesterday to a piece by Chris Kenny I was a bit taken aback to find out that the US is going to be victorious a second time:

Even those who opposed the Iraq war should recognise that America leaving the country victorious, with a relatively peaceful and functioning democracy in place, is far preferable to the war having been lost.

I nearly coughed up my falafel when I read this because there is so much to contest about it. I won't go into the meaning of 'victorious' because that's an essay in itself. But when you have lost nearly 4,500 dead and over 30,000 wounded, spent untold billions of dollars, but did not achieve the aim of the invasion (finding WMD, I think — it was so long ago), calling it a victory is 'interesting'.

But leaving aside the notion of a victorious US triumphantly ceasing combat operations seven years later than it thought it had, and only having to leave behind a skeleton force of 50,000, I do take some exception to his view of Iraq as relatively peaceful. Relativity is a funny thing, and if Kenny's intent was to compare Iraq with, say, Afghanistan or Somalia then he may have a point.

But to say that a country in which 253 civilians were killed in December, 118 in January and 80 in the first week of this month is relatively peaceful is drawing a (relatively) long bow. And that's not to mention the Iraqi security forces, or the numbers wounded. Space precludes me from arguing the toss about a 'functioning democracy' (or is that a 'relatively' functioning democracy?).

But the best line from this 'we showed 'em' view of foreign relations comes after the Iraq section:

This leaves Afghanistan. And it is here that there are signs Obama may be learning about the audacity of strength.

Surely after the tragedy of the Iraqi adventure, armchair pundits should be more attuned to the limitations, rather than the audacity, of strength in campaigns in complex environments.

Photo by Flickr user mashroms, used under a Creative Commons license.

Part one here; part two here; part three here.

And finally, to the Levant. Hopes were high following the pro-West coalition's 'victory' in the June 2009 elections that Lebanon would stay in the Western camp and cease to be hostage to external actors, but most realistic observers of Lebanon understand that elections are one thing and influence another.

On that score, the departure of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt from the coalition in August and the inability to form a 'national unity' government under Sa'ad Hariri until November (as portfolio distribution was incessantly debated) showed how little Lebanon was in control of its destiny. As if to confirm that Syria was a main player in Lebanon again, Sa'ad Hariri visited Damascus in December. But despite the political infighting and shaky security, Beirut is still Beirut and so Lebanon enjoyed its most successful tourism season ever in 2009.
 
While the new year began with the normal sabre-rattling involving Hizbullah, this year international conflict involving Lebanon may take place not on its border with Israel, but in New York as it takes up its place for the next two years as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. With votes likely this year on sanctions against Iran and the Hariri tribunal, there are fears that Lebanon's voting patterns may favour Syria and Iran, and place it in conflict with many of the Government's Western aid donors.  
 
Over the mountains, things are looking up for Syria in 2010. It is being wooed heavily to distance itself from Iran, it has enjoyed increased influence in Lebanon, a reciprocal visit from Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, and the US announcement of its first ambassador to Damascus for nearly five years. Not bad for doing nothing.

Part one here; part two here.

Iraq (remember that place? It used to be in the news quite a bit) is the one country in the Middle East which could see significant developments in 2010, but I'm not sure whether the net effect will be particularly good.

Politically, the good news is that the electoral law was passed last year, allowing elections to go ahead in March, and holding the promise of a more established Arab democracy emerging. Unfortunately, some of the characteristics of functioning democracies, such as the impartiality and independence of electoral bodies, are yet to develop, if the actions of the rather Orwellian Accountability and Justice Commission are anything to go by.   

The Accountability and Justice Law (very good and detailed analysis here) appears to have done little other than to stir up the sectarian hornet's nest that is post-Saddam Iraqi politics. General Petraeus, head of US Central Command, highlighted the damage this body could do to sectarian reconciliation in an interview with The Times last week.

My colleague Jenny Hayward-Jones and I have written previously about Iran's attempts to influence and reward the Solomon Islands for its UN votes. But Pacific micro-states' voting patterns are of equal if not greater interest to Israel.

This week the presidents, foreign ministers and ambassadors of the Federated States of Micronesia and Nauru are enjoying a week-long state visit to Israel. The Presidents of Palau and the Marshall Islands were unable to make the trip, unfortunately. All are noted supporters of Israel in the UN, even if the average Israeli is not sure why. Still, a vote's a vote. 

The Solomon Islands wasn't invited, likely because of the Government's decision to vote in the UN in favour of accepting the Goldstone Report, which was critical of Israeli actions during the conduct of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza.

Photo by Flickr user thejcgerm, used under a Creative Commons license.

The unsuccessful bombing plot against an American airliner at Christmas, a plot which had its origins in Yemen, did what my posts on The Interpreter and my Lowy paper (co-authored with a real Yemen expert, Sarah Phillips from Sydney Uni) could not do — focus the media's attention on Yemen. 

It also appears to have focused the mind of the Yemeni Government (which has multiple security issues to worry about), and it has had significant success against al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), if its own statements can be believed. The problem is that not many of them can be verified, let alone believed, so it's pretty difficult to judge fact from fiction.  

Yemeni Government sources claimed a 17 December air strike killed 34 militants in Abyan province, while locals claimed that many civilians were victims of the raid, and that alleged AQAP members conducted a rally at the site the next day. On 24 December another air raid reportedly claimed the lives of AQAP's emir, Nassir al-Wahayshi, along with the Yemeni/American cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi, though this has been challenged in other media reports.  

Six months ago Sam wrote a post about Qatar's decision to purchase two C-17 cargo aircraft and how they would provide a good national advertisement in times of humanitarian crisis. 

The Haiti earthquake has provided the Qatari Government with its first opportunity to dispatch aid in the very recognisable livery of a Qatar Airways C-17. 

In the world of diplomatic self-promotion, being small but rich means you don't have to be invisible. And with wealthy Gulf states seeing the provision of humanitarian aid as a way of projecting soft power, expect to see more photos of Gulf C-17s during future humanitarian crises.

Part one here. 

Ahh, the Middle East peace process. I really do think I'm on firm ground here when I predict that the MEPP will look the same at the end of 2010 as it did at the start — going nowhere. The reasons are pretty well summed up in some exchanges from last year.
 
In May 2009 Secretary of State Clinton issued a very public demand to the Israeli Government that there must be no exceptions to President Obama's call for Israel to stop its settlement activity as a precondition for peace talks with the Palestinians: 'Not some settlements, not outposts, not natural growth exceptions. We think it is in the best interest of the effort that we are engaged in that settlement expansion cease.'
 
This hard-line approach was followed up very quickly when, in June 2009, President Obama said in his Cairo speech that 'Israelis must acknowledge that just as Israel's right to exist cannot be denied, neither can Palestine's. The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.' read more

If there is one thing I've learned from following, living in and writing about the Middle East as an Australian it is that, while many of my countrymen say they find the region fascinating, it is fair to say most Australians believe it to be of peripheral concern despite our substantial economic interests and the fact that we seem to continually send the ADF there.

So, to fit in with the average Australian's attention span for all things Middle Eastern, I'll try to write a series of short posts offering my views on what is likely to happen in certain countries in the region this year. I feel safe in offering such predictions because the opaque decision-making process of many of the actors, the number and nature of internal and external pressures facing states, and the regional rivalries and biases that often colour decision-making all mean that few if any outside observers get it right.    
 
Iran will continue to concentrate minds in the US in particular, but I can't see much policy headway being made and the situation at the end of the year will be little different from now. A sputtering domestic resistance movement may survive but will gradually lose momentum or split, but either way is not likely to threaten the regime's survival. I have said since the disputed elections last year that the election was not as pivotal as some people hoped or believed. The regime has a very tight grip on its security forces, and the opposition, while persistent, lacks a unifying vision or even a centralised leadership. This interesting post points to the challenges facing the Iranian protest movement. read more

Sam asked why a small country like the UAE needs the services of six (although other reports say four) C-17 strategic airlift aircraft. What could they possibly be used for?

In the absence of any strategic planning document such as a White Paper, besieged by international arms manufacturers seeking to recycle petrodollars back to their home economies, and always keen for the prestige of operating advanced military equipment, the equipment decisions made by Gulf military forces are not always made in a measured or logical manner.

That said, there is some justification for integral strategic lift. Since the 1990s the UAE has been quite active in deploying forces overseas. It has deployed a battalion to Somalia as part of the UN force in 1993, an armoured battle group (including Apache helicopters) to Kosovo from 1999, a military medical task force to Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake and a special forces group to Afghanistan.
 
In addition, UAE aid to regional neighbours has on occasion necessitated heavy lift. During the 2007 fighting at Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Lebanon, the UAE donated nine Gazelle helicopters to the Lebanese Air Force that were pressed into service almost immediately on arrival. The UAE aso gifted ten Puma trooplift helicopters to Lebanon last year. 

Similar civilian or military aid missions are likely to be conducted in the future and, while the UAE is more than financially capable of contracting out such heavy lift requirements, the purchase of C-17s provides it with transport self-sufficiency and the regional status this brings.

Photo by Flickr user Ozone9999, Duke and Sarge, used under a Creative Commons license.

My attention was drawn to an opinion piece in today's Australian that portrays the Middle East as locked in a modern-day Cold War pitting an expansionist, anti-Western Iran against a bloc of regional countries trying to valiantly resist the advances of the perfidious Persians.

I agree with elements of the piece — Iran is without doubt trying to expand its regional influence (which inevitably brings it into competition with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the erstwhile regional leaders), and it sees the development of a nuclear capability as the ultimate guarantor of the regime's security.

But much of the piece falls into the familiar trap of conflating Iranian intentions with capabilities, and of ignoring the motivations of various regional actors, particularly those in receipt of Iranian financial or security assistance.
 
The so-called pro-Iranian bloc is not much of a bloc, and neither does it show much of an inclination to replicate Iran's governance model. Lebanese Hizbullah is the only organisation that could legitimately be said to look to Tehran as a political model, but the demographic realities of Lebanon mean this will remain an aspirational goal for future generations (if the Iranian regime lasts that long). 

While those of you who have returned from the coast or overseas are counting the cost of your holiday, spare a thought for the poor citizens of the Gulf Arab states, some of whom are forced to get by on an average per capita GDP of a little over US$70,000.

The UAE's US$52,000 figure gives it the Arab world's second highest per capita GDP, but this figure doesn't tell the entire truth. The UAE's figure is skewed by the oil wealth of the emirate of Abu Dhabi, which had to give a lending hand to neighbouring Dubai not once but twice last year as the bottom fell out of the over-priced Dubai property market.

Which makes yesterday's opening of the world's tallest building in the emirate where the property market has crashed somewhat anomalous, although the re-naming of the tower from Burj Dubai to Burj Khalifa (after the president of the UAE and ruler of Abu Dhabi) is anything but anomalous.

 Photo by Flickr user saharsh, used under a Creative Commons license.